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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Melvin Winn appeals from the judgment of conviction entered on his guilty 
plea to sexual abuse of a minor under sixteen. Winn contends the district court 
abused its discretion in denying his pre-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
and in imposing sentence. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Winn sexually abused his granddaughter, J.H., by having oral-genital and 
manual-genital contact with her on several occasions when she was between six-
and eight-years old. (PSI, pp.2-4. 1) Winn also showed J.H. pornographic movies 
and asked her if "she wanted to try what was being done on the screen." (PSI, p.3.) 
J.H. "refused" but Winn proceeded to abuse her anyway. (Id.) 
J.H. originally reported the abuse in 2008 after she was discovered "mooning" 
her brother, M.H. (PSI, p.115.) When confronted about her behavior, J.H. said she 
did it because she wanted her brother to give her something. (Id.) J.H. also 
disclosed that Winn touched her vagina then took her to McDonald's and the dollar 
store where he bought her a "doctor set." (PSI, pp.115-116.) When interviewed by 
law enforcement, Winn denied any abuse and only acknowledged that he may have 
accidentally touched J.H.'s vagina while playing with her. (PSI, pp.116-117.) 
Although a CARES interview was conducted in which J.H. disclosed the abuse, 
Winn was not prosecuted at that time because the state did not feel it had enough to 
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file "WINN 
psi.pdf." 
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prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt "in part because of the defendant and his 
family." (Tr., p.36, Ls.14-20, p.39, Ls.13-20.) 
In 2011, the abuse came to the attention of authorities again when J.H.'s 
brother, M.H., reported to a CARES interviewer that he witnessed Winn "molesting" 
J.H. (PSI, p.4.) J.H. again confirmed the ongoing abuse. (PSI, p.4.) Law 
enforcement interviewed Winn a second time. Winn said it was "possible" he 
touched J.H. but "claimed he could not remember due to the time and illegal drug 
use." (PSI, p.97.) Winn requested, and was scheduled for, a polygraph. (PSI, 
p.98.) During a pre-test interview by the polygrapher, Winn admitted he sexually 
abused J.H. by touching her vagina "on 5 or 6 different occasions" and performing 
oral sex on her "on 2 or 3 different occasions." (PSI, p.102.) 
A grand jury indicted Winn on one count of lewd conduct with a minor under 
sixteen with a sentencing enhancement based on a prior conviction for a 
registerable sex offense. (R., pp.6-7, 9-10.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Winn 
pied guilty to an amended charge of sexual abuse of a minor under sixteen with 
"open sentencing."2 (Tr., p.5, Ls.19-24 (terms of plea), pp.8-15 (plea colloquy); see 
R., pp.57-58.) 
After he pied guilty, but prior to sentencing, Winn filed a motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea. (R., p.72.) The court denied the motion. (Tr., p.25, L.19 - p.26, 
L.14.) The court subsequently imposed a unified 25-year sentence with 12 years 
fixed. (R., pp.77-79.) Winn filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.84-86.) 
2 The state also agreed to dismiss the enhancement. (Tr., p.7, Ls.22-24.) 
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ISSUES 
Winn states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Winn's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified 
sentence of twenty-five years, with twelve years fixed, upon Mr. 
Winn following his plea of guilty? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Winn failed to establish an abuse of discretion in the denial of his 
pre-sentencing motion for withdrawal of his guilty plea given Winn's failure to show a 
just reason that would entitle him to withdraw his plea? 
2. Has Winn failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by 
imposing a unified 25-year sentence with 12 years fixed for sexual abuse of a minor 
under sixteen given the nature of the offense and Winn's history as a repeated sex 
offender? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Winn Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Concluding 
Winn Did Not Provide A Just Reason That Would Entitle Him To Withdraw His Guilty 
Plea 
A. Introduction 
Winn contends the district court abused its discretion in denying his pre-
sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing "there was newly discovered 
evidence that could plausibly have motivated a reasonable person in his position not 
to plead guilty." (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) Winn further asserts the state "did not 
demonstrate that prejudice would result from withdrawal of the plea." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.5.) The record, however, supports the district court's determination that 
Winn failed to demonstrate a just reason entitling him to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Winn has therefore failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to 
whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished from 
arbitrary action." State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536, 211 P.3d 775, 780-
781 (Ct. App. 2008) ( citing State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 362, 941 P .2d 330, 
334 (Ct. App. 1997)). An appellate court will defer to the trial court's factual findings 
if they are supported by substantial competent evidence. State v. Holland, 135 
Idaho 159, 15 P.3d 1167 (2000); Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254, 869 P.2d 571 
(Ct. App. 1994). 
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C. Winn Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Denying His Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is governed by I.C.R. 33(c), which 
provides: 
(c) Withdrawal of plea of guilty. A motion to withdraw a plea of 
guilty may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of 
sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after 
sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the 
defendant to withdraw defendant's plea. 
Although a district court's discretion should be "liberally exercised" when 
ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea made prior to the pronouncement of 
sentence, withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an automatic right. Hanslovan, 147 
Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780. See also State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787 
P.2d 281, 284 (1990). Rather, "the defendant has the burden of showing a 'just 
reason' exists to withdraw the plea." Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780 
(citations omitted). Failure to present and support a just or plausible reason, even 
absent prejudice to the prosecution, will weigh against granting withdrawal. State v. 
Mayer, 139 Idaho 643, 647, 84 P.3d 579, 583 (Ct. App. 2004). "[T]he good faith, 
credibility, and weight of the defendant's assertions in support of his motion to 
withdraw his plea are matters for the trial court to decide." Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 
537, 211 P.3d at 782 (citations omitted). 
"The first step in analyzing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is to determine 
whether the plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made." Hanslovan, 
147 Idaho at 536, 211 P.3d at 781 (citing State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 959, 
801 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Ct. App. 1990)). "If the plea is constitutionally valid, the court 
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must then determine whether there are any other just reasons for withdrawal of the 
plea." !sL 
On appeal, Winn "asserts he showed a just reason to withdraw his guilty 
plea," claiming "there was newly discovered evidence that could plausibly have 
motivated a reasonable person in his position not to plead guilty." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.6.) Winn "recommends that this Court hold that newly discovered evidence, that 
could plausibly have motivated a reasonable person in the defendant's position not 
to plead guilty, is a just reason to permit the defendant to withdraw a guilty plea." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) It is unclear from this argument whether Winn is claiming 
that his plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary at the time it was made or 
whether his claim is that a plea that was valid at the time it was entered may 
nevertheless be withdrawn under the "just reason" standard where there is "newly 
discovered evidence that could plausibly have motivated a reasonable person not to 
plead guilty." To the extent Winn contends his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily made, the record shows otherwise. 
Before Winn entered his guilty plea, the court explained, and Winn said he 
understood, the nature of the charge to which Winn was pleading and the elements 
the state would have to prove in order for a jury to find him guilty of that charge. (Tr., 
p.9, L.8 - p.10, L.8.) After the state provided a factual basis for the charge, Winn 
indicated that although he had a "fuzzy memory" of committing the offense due to his 
methamphetamine use, he believed he committed the crime. (Tr., p.13, L.13 - p.14, 
L.6.) Winn also completed a guilty plea questionnaire in which he acknowledged the 
rights he was waiving by pleading guilty and agreed that his plea was free and 
6 
voluntary and that he was guilty of "the acts alleged in the information or indictment." 
(R., pp.60-66.) Winn also answered "no" to the question, "Are there any witnesses 
whose testimony would show that you are innocent?" (R., p.64.) In light of Winn's 
representations, the court found Winn understood "the nature of the offense and the 
consequences of his plea of guilty," that there was a "factual basis for the guilty 
plea," and "that the guilty plea was freely and voluntarily made." (Tr., p.14, Ls.20_. 
25.) The record supports the district court's findings in this regard. 
When Winn sought to withdraw his guilty plea, the basis for his motion was 
that "he received some additional information from family members that he was not 
privy to prior that he thinks would affect the state's case." (Tr., p.20, Ls.3-6.) 
Because Winn did not identify what the "additional information" was, the prosecutor 
speculated: 
I don't know what the supposed new evidence is other than we did 
learn and I think we had disclosed that life for [J.H.] hasn't gotten much 
easier. 
There is a report that her brother, who was a witness to some of 
this abuse, who lives in a different home, has since perpetrated on her, 
and that was new information that came out. And I think the defendant 
is thinking that that's something that he can use. It's the only thing I 
can guess, because other than that, there's no other new information 
that has come about. 
And even as we stand here today, you have been given no 
reason, just that he has received some information from family that he 
didn't know of before. There's no information that takes away from the 
nature of this crime. There's nothing about the information that the 
state has received or turned over to the defense that negates what 
happened in 2008. 
7 
And so really you're just left here to guess, and I'm guessing 
with you, based on what I know has developed in the case, but you 
haven't been provided a reason. 
(Tr., p.23, L.5 - p.24, L.15.) 
Winn responded by reminding the court that he pied guilty pursuant to Alford 
because he had no "independent memory of this happening" (Tr., p.24, L.23 - p.25, 
L. 1), and arguing: 
I don't see any prejudice to the state in having the plea 
withdrawn. They did disclose additional information about [M.H.] 
abusing the same victim, and that was prior to his plea. But in 
conversations he has had with family members, his understanding is 
that these allegations basically started in 2006. 
And so he believes, again, that that information changes the 
state's case in some regard, and he maintains his innocence and 
therefore he would like to proceed to trial. 
(Tr., p.25, Ls.8-18). 
The court denied the motion, concluding: 
At the time [Winn pied guilty,] he knew of the allegations of molestation 
committed upon the victim by a different family member. And so I don't 
see that really as providing sufficient cause that convinces me that 
there's just cause to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea. 
It seems more likely to me that his -- that he is having some 
second thoughts, but that there's not information that it would be able 
to be unjust to disallow him to withdraw his plea. 
(Tr., p.25, L.24 - p.26, L.11.) 
Winn contends the district court abused its discretion, arguing "there was 
newly discovered evidence that could plausibly have motived a reasonable person in 
[his] position not to plead guilty" and the state failed to "demonstrate that prejudice 
would result from the withdrawal of the plea." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) The Court 
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need not reach the question of prejudice because Winn has failed to meet his 
burden of showing any "newly discovered evidence" that would support a "just 
reason" for withdrawing his plea. 
Winn did not actually present any newly discovered evidence in support of his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Instead, he made vague claims that some 
unidentified "family members" said there were allegations about M.H. abusing J.H. 
starting in 2006. Although not relied on by Winn, presumably the family member to 
which he refers is his daughter, Tina, J.H. and M.H.'s aunt, who accuses J.H. and 
M.H. of making "several allegations about other adults over many years, none which 
[sic] have ever been true" and claims "[b]oth children are currently being investigated 
for participating in sexual acts which one of them has admitted they have been doing 
for several years." (PSI, p.125.) Tina also claims M.H. wrote an apology letter 
because "he had been caught lying about things he said happened." (PSI, p.125.) 
Winn also mentioned this letter to the presentence investigator, but the letter has 
never been produced. (PSI, p.5.) 
Winn claims "the allegations about M.H. abusing J.H started in 2006 raises 
new questions about [his] involvement in the abuse" and "suggests that there could 
have been an alternate perpetrator." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) As noted, Winn 
presented no actual evidence that M.H. started abusing J.H. in 2006. Not even 
Tina's letter supports this assertion. Nor is there any evidence that J.H. has made 
such a claim. To the contrary, the record indicates that J.H. told the CARES 
interviewer in 2011 that "her older brother 'now did the same things to [her that 
Winn] did."' (PSI, p.4 (emphasis added).) 
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Even assuming M.H. began modeling Winn's behaviors in 2008, or before, 
this does not make M.H. an "alternate perpetrator," it only makes J.H. a victim of two 
offenders rather than one as J.H. has been quite clear about the sexual abuse 
perpetrated on her by Winn. More importantly, J.H.'s disclosures about M.H. doing 
the "same things to [her]" was made to a CARES interviewer and was information 
that was undoubtedly available to Winn before he entered his guilty plea. As such, it 
is not "newly discovered." State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 137, 765 P.2d 162 (Ct. App. 
1988), is instructive. 
In Hocker, the defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea to delivery of a 
controlled substance. 115 Idaho 137, 765 P.2d 162. The basis for Hocker's motion 
was his "desire to confront an informant who had told law enforcement officers about 
his drug activities" and the fact that "he had not admitted his guilt unconditionally." 
kl at 138, 765 P .2d at 163. The Court concluded Hocker "failed to establish a just 
reason for plea withdrawal which would entitle him to relief under even the most 
lenient standard." kl at 139, 765 P.2d at 164. The Court reasoned: 
Hocker has not identified any questions he might have asked, or any 
other benefit his defense might have gained, if the informant had 
testified at trial. Indeed, Hocker voluntarily waived the right to confront 
the informant, or any other potential witness, when he entered his plea. 
Thus, Hocker's argument boils down to his bare desire to exercise a 
voluntarily waived right. We hold that, without more, this does not 
constitute a just reason to withdraw a valid, carefully entered plea. 
Hocker, 115 Idaho at 139, 765 P.2d at 164. 
In a footnote, the Court also noted: 
In presenting Hocker's motion to withdraw the plea, defense counsel 
made a vague allusion to "newly discovered evidence" of possible 
criminal activity by the informant. However, this evidence was never 
described. We think the attorney's passing comment was insufficient 
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to demonstrate a just reason for withdrawing Hocker's plea. Of course, 
we do not suggest that newly discovered evidence never can be an 
adequate ground to withdraw a plea. We simply hold that the nature of 
the evidence, and its potential relevance to this case, were not 
sufficiently established on the record. 
Hocker, 115 Idaho at 139 n.2, 765 P.2d at 164 n.2. 
As for Hocker's claim that he should have been entitled to withdraw his plea 
given his conditional admission of guilt, the Court noted Hocker "freely admitted his 
guilt on each element of the crime" and that, "when asked whether he believed he 
was innocent, he stated that he was guilty." Hocker, 115 Idaho at 139, 765 P.2d at 
164. 
Winn distinguishes his case from Hocker, arguing, "Unlike the 'vague allusion' 
to newly discovered evidence" in that case, "the nature of [his] newly discovered 
evidence and its potential relevance were sufficiently established in this case." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.8.) To the contrary, as explained, Winn's allegations were not 
only vague, the evidence was not "newly discovered." In addition, although Winn 
pied guilty pursuant to Alford3 "based upon [his] methamphetamine use at the time 
of the offense" (Tr., p.7, Ls.19-21), when asked whether he believed he was guilty, 
Winn said, "I think so, sir, yes" (Tr., p.13, L.25 - p.14, L.2). Winn also admitted his 
guilt, in detail, during a pre-polygraph interview. (PSI, p.102.) Thus, to the extent 
Winn claims the "conditional" nature of his guilty plea weighs in favor of withdrawal, it 
does not. 
Winn also "recommends that this Court adopt [the] reasoning" of United 
States v. Garcia, 401 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2005). (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) The 
3 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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defendant in Garcia moved to withdraw his plea based, in part, on newly discovered 
evidence, which he proffered in the form of an affidavit from a witness who was 
"unknown to the defense at the time of the plea." 401 F.3d at 1010 and n.2. The 
affidavit "directly contradict[ed]" the statements of a different witness who implicated 
Garcia in manufacturing methamphetamine. kl at 1009-1010. The Ninth Circuit 
concluded the affidavit was "newly discovered evidence" that entitled Garcia to 
withdraw his plea because it "raise[d] new questions about Garcia's involvement in 
the illegal activity" and because "had Garcia known about th[e] evidence earlier, he 
may well have changed his mind about whether to plead guilty." kl at 1011. The 
Ninth Circuit alternatively articulated the standard as whether the newly discovered 
evidence "could have at least plausibly motivated a reasonable person in Garcia's 
position not to have pied guilty had he known about the evidence prior to pleading." 
kl at 1011-1012. 
This Court need not address whether to adopt the standard announced by the 
Ninth Circuit in Garcia because Winn cannot overcome the initial hurdle of showing 
the evidence upon which his motion to withdraw was premised is "newly 
discovered." Even if he could, and even if this Court accepts Winn's request to 
follow Garcia, a reasonable person in Winn's position would not have been 
motivated to change his decision to plead guilty based on a claim that his victim was 
also sexually abused by her brother particularly where, as here, the victim has twice 
identified Winn as an abuser and has provided pointed details regarding the nature 
of the abuse. Winn's claim otherwise is unpersuasive, especially since he admitted 
the abuse to the polygrapher. 
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Because Winn failed to provide a just reason for withdrawal of his guilty plea, 
he has failed to establish the district court abused its discretion in denying his 
motion. 
11. 
Winn Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Winn contends the district court abused its discretion in imposing sentencing 
by allegedly failing to "adequately consider" Winn's "substance abuse problems" and 
his "goal of getting treatment." (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-12.) Winn has failed to 
establish an abuse of discretion given the nature of the offense, his character, and 
the objectives of sentencing. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A district court's sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009). 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion 
In order to demonstrate an abuse of the district court's sentencing discretion, 
Winn must "establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was 
excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment." State v. Stover, 140 
Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005). Those objectives are: "(1) protection of 
society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrong doing." State v. Wolfe, 99 
Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978). Winn cannot meet his burden in this 
case. 
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Winn claims the district court abused its sentencing discretion by failing to 
"adequately consider" his "substance abuse problems" and "goal of getting 
treatment." (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-12.) Other than his apparent belief that his 
sentence should be shorter because of either or both of these circumstances, Winn 
has failed to identify anything in the record that would support his assertion that the 
court did not "adequately consider" that information. The district court indicated it 
"read everything that is included in the presentence report," which contained 
information about Winn's substance abuse problem and plan for treatment. (PSI, 
p.16.) This was also the centerpiece of Winn's sentencing argument. (Tr., p.40, 
L.22 - p.42, L.7.) As such, Winn cannot seriously contend the district court was not 
acutely aware of this information. That the district court did not impose a lesser 
sentence because of it does not establish an abuse of discretion. Rather, the district 
court properly focused on the fact that Winn "presents a substantial risk to re-
offend ." (Tr., p.47, Ls.2-4.) This assessment is supported by the record. 
Winn has a prior conviction for lewd conduct for molesting a different child 
and a subsequent conviction for providing false information on his sex offender 
registration. (PSI, pp.6, 8, 11.) "Winn was terminated from sexual offender 
treatment for non-compliance when it was discovered he was in the process of 
grooming two (2) minor females." (PSI, p.14.) The fact that Winn is a repeat sex 
offender who cannot comply with registration requirements and who is a pedophile 
that is a high-risk to reoffend (PSI, pp.358, 380), reveals that our most vulnerable 
population, our children, require protection from him, satisfying the primary objective 
of sentencing. State v. Moore, 78 Idaho 359,363,304 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1956) 
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("The primary consideration is, and presumptively always will be, the good order and 
protection of society."). 
Winn has failed to establish the district court abused its sentencing discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Winn's judgment of 
conviction for sexual abuse of a minor under sixteen. 
DATED this 18th day of April, 2013. 
JESSIC~ . LORELLO 
Deputy A orney General 
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